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Between August 2011 and January 2013, an outbreak 
of Salmonella enterica serovar Stanley (S. Stanley) 
infections affected 10 European Union (EU) coun-
tries, with a total of 710 cases recorded. Following an 
urgent inquiry in the Epidemic Intelligence Information 
System for food- and waterborne diseases (EPIS-FWD) 
on 29 June 2012, an international investigation was 
initiated including EU and national agencies for public 
health, veterinary health and food safety.  Two of three 
local outbreak investigations undertaken by affected 
countries in 2012 identified turkey meat as a vehicle of 
infection. Furthermore, routine EU monitoring of ani-
mal sources showed that over 95% (n=298) of the 311 
S. Stanley isolates reported from animal sampling in 
2011 originated from the turkey food production chain. 
In 2004–10, none had this origin. Pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis (PFGE) profile analysis of outbreak isolates 
and historical S. Stanley human isolates revealed that 
the outbreak isolates had a novel PFGE profile that 
emerged in Europe in 2011. An indistinguishable PFGE 
profile was identified in 346 of 464 human, food, feed, 
environmental and animal isolates from 16 EU coun-
tries: 102 of 112 non-human isolates tested were from 
the turkey production chain. On the basis of epidemio-
logical and microbiological evidence, turkey meat was 
considered the primary source of human infection, fol-
lowing contamination early in the animal production 
chain.
Introduction
In Europe, between 2007 and 2011, Salmonella 
enterica serovar Stanley (S. Stanley) was relatively 
rarely reported in humans, with 2,647 S. Stanley 
cases reported to the European Surveillance System 
(TESSy) during the five-year period [1]. Reporting of all 
Salmonella cases is mandatory within the European 
Union (EU). Of the 2,044 cases with information on prob-
able country of infection, 1,498 (73%) were acquired 
outside the EU, of whom above 80% had recorded trav-
elling to south-east Asia in the days before symptom 
onset; nine cases per month were autochthonous [2,3]. 
In 2004–10, there were eight reports per month of 
isolation of S. Stanley from food, animals and feed by 
EU Member States [2,3]. In the past 10 years, only two 
reports of S. Stanley outbreaks in Europe have been 
published: in 2001, an international outbreak (involv-
ing Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom) due to 
the consumption of imported peanuts [4] and in 2007, 
an outbreak in Sweden linked to alfalfa sprouts [5].
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There is no indication that the clinical presentation of 
S. Stanley cases differs from that of other non-typhoi-
dal Salmonella infections, especially in terms of sever-
ity [6].
On 29 June 2012, the Belgium National Reference 
Centre for Salmonella reported the detection of 20 
autochtonous cases of S. Stanley infection in the first 
half of 2012, compared with 3, 6 and 19 cases detected 
in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively. S. Stanley iso-
lates from the 20 cases in 2012 were all nalidixic acid 
resistant and 18 of them had an indistinguishable Xbal 
pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) pattern. On 
3 July 2012, Germany reported a twofold increase in 
the number of cases of S. Stanley infection in the first 
half of 2012 compared with the number in same period 
the previous years, with 34 domestic and nine travel-
related cases. On 11 July 2012, Hungary also notified 
an increase in the number of cases of S. Stanley infec-
tion, with 63 cases in 2012 compared with the 2 to 10 
cases expected annually. On 17 July 2012, the Belgium 
National Reference Centre for Salmonella confirmed 
the PFGE pattern of isolates from the Hungarian cases 
was indistinguishable from the Belgian pattern. On 6 
August 2012, Austria reported an increase in the num-
ber of cases of S. Stanley infection (n=37) with a nali-
dixic acid mono-resistant profile observed between 
April and July, compared with eight cases in the first 
quarter that year.
As more information from the food sector became avail-
able, the European Commission asked the European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for 
technical assistance in the evaluation of information 
collected during the outbreak investigation. Rapid out-
break assessments were initiated by ECDC in collabo-
ration with EFSA, the European Reference Laboratory 
for Salmonella (EURL-Salmonella) and affected EU/
European Economic Area (EEA) countries to identify 
outbreak-related cases, describe the outbreak size 
and progression and provide evidence supporting the 
implementation of control measures. ECDC provided 
the first assessment of this information on 27 July 2012 
[2], an update on 29 August and a further update jointly 
with EFSA on 21 September 2012 [3]. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first large multicountry outbreak of 
S. Stanley infection, investigated through both epide-
miological and microbiological investigation coordi-
nated at the EU level.  
Methods
Epidemiological and microbiological information 
for risk analysis was shared through the Epidemic 
Intelligence Information System for food- and water-
borne diseases (EPIS-FWD) [7]. 
European Union outbreak case definition
A probable case was defined as a person with S. Stanley 
infection with an onset of symptoms after August 2011, 
and no travel history outside the EU in the seven days 
before the symptom onset, to focus the investigation 
on likely sources of infection within the EU. The defi-
nition’s date restriction was chosen as the increased 
incidence in Hungary was observed from this time. 
A confirmed case was a probable case with isolates 
showing an XbaI-PFGE pattern indistinguishable from 
the outbreak strain first detected in Belgium. Cases 
from whom isolates were tested by XbaI -PFGE and 
results patterns were different from the outbreak strain 
were excluded. 
The case definition did not include antimicrobial sensi-
tivity information. A ‘case’ refers to probable and con-
firmed cases, unless otherwise specified. A country 
reporting at least one confirmed case was considered 
affected. 
From 1 October 2012, a monitoring phase was initiated: 
EU/EEA countries were asked to provide ECDC with their 
aggregate monthly number of non-travel-associated 
cases of S. Stanley infection. ECDC removed its recom-
mendation on PFGE confirmation, which was costly and 
time consuming, to monitor the overall trend. 
Epidemiological investigations
Data on cases were collected by national public health 
institutes. Baseline incidence was established by 
reviewing surveillance reports of human S. Stanley 
infection since 2007 (ECDC) and reports of S. Stanley 
infection in animals, food and feed since 2004 (EFSA). 
Population data were obtained from the 2010 Eurostat 
population dataset [8] and the incidence ranges per 
million population were determined using the geomet-
rical interval classification method (ArcGIS v.10.2).
Investigators in Austria and Hungary created hypothe-
sis-generating questionnaires, which served as a basis 
for the development of a standard EU questionnaire for 
interview of retrospective and prospective cases. The 
questionnaire focused on selected exposures in the 
seven days before symptom onset, and was shared 
with countries on 4 September 2011. 
Microbiological investigations
For the microbiological investigations, the outbreak 
strain was defined as the first S. Stanley strain 
detected in Belgium in 2012. Outbreak isolates were 
isolates with an indistinguishable XbaI-PFGE pattern 
to the outbreak strain; no single band differences were 
accepted. 
ECDC, EFSA and EURL-Salmonella jointly prepared a 
laboratory testing protocol for human, food and ani-
mal isolates, requesting PFGE analyses of selected 
S. Stanley isolates using the PulseNet protocol and 
XbaI [9]. The clonality of the XbaI-PFGE outbreak strain 
was further analysed using a selection of human, ani-
mal, food and environmental isolates from Austria, 
Belgium and Hungary through use of a second restric-
tion enzyme, BnlI. EU/EEA public health institutes were 
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requested to share with ECDC PFGE typing results of 
isolates from patients meeting the EU outbreak case 
definition; animal health and food safety authorities 
were requested to share with EURL-Salmonella the 
PFGE typing results of S. Stanley-positive isolates with 
the outbreak strain from animal, food and environment 
sampling.
EU/EEA veterinary and food reference laboratories 
were requested to share PFGE typing results from iso-
lates from food, feed, environment and animals since 
2007 and to perform PFGE typing on stored S. Stanley 
isolates from January 2011 onwards, and on new 
isolations. 
Quality assessment of the shared PFGE gel pictures 
was performed according to the PulseNet international 
protocol PNQ01 [10]. Cluster analysis was performed 
using Bionumerics V6.6 (Applied Maths, Sint-Martens-
Laten, Belgium) with tolerance and optimisation set 
at 1.5%. Analysis of the pattern variation within the 
clusters was reassessed setting the optimisation and 
tolerance thresholds at 1%. A cluster was defined as a 
group of isolates of S. Stanley with indistinguishable 
XbaI-PFGE patterns. 
The PulseNet Europe PFGE database hosted at ECDC 
was used to assess the genetic diversity of historical 
European S. Stanley isolates and to compare outbreak 
isolates’ patterns with those of the 21,748 isolates 
of Salmonella spp. imaged between 1994 and 2008. 
In addition, ECDC consulted the EU Member States to 
determine whether they had identified the outbreak 
strain between 2008 and 2011. The Hunter–Gaston 
index was used to calculate the discriminatory power 
of the XbaI-PFGE typing [11].
International food safety notifications inside 
and outside the EU
 ECDC liaised with the Rapid Alert System for Food and 
Feed (RASFF) of the European Commission to facilitate 
identification of internationally distributed products 
contaminated with S. Stanley. The International Food 
Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) issued an alert 
on 20 July 2012 to identify cases outside the EU/EEA. 
Figure 1
Confirmed and probable cases of Salmonella Stanley infection in humans by month of report in affected European Union 
Member States, August 2011–January 2013 (n=710)a
ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control; EFSA: European Food Safety Authority; EPIS-FWD:  Epidemic Intelligence 
Information System for food- and waterborne diseases; RASFF: Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed.












































Austria investigated two local outbreaks. The first 
occurred in September 2011, before the multicoun-
try alert [3] (Figure 1). A descriptive epidemiological 
study identified that all 32 cases (of whom five were 
confirmed) ate at a turkey kebab stand. No turkey meat 
remained for testing, but a sauce sample and dishcloth 
from the stand tested positive for S. Stanley. Both 
XbaI- and BnlI-PFGE analyses of the human, food and 
environmental isolates from this cluster were indis-
tinguishable from that of the Belgian outbreak strain. 
The second outbreak occurred in August 2012 with 62 
cases (of whom 54 were confirmed) following a local 
community event in Upper Austria [3]. Descriptive 
and analytical epidemiological investigations by the 
national Agency for Health and Food Safety (Agentur 
für Gesundheit und Ernährungssicherheit, AGES), 
assisting the local public health authorities, identified 
an association between the disease and consumption 
of a potato salad prepared by a person subsequently 
identified to have had an asymptomatic infection with 
the S. Stanley outbreak strain [3].
In Hungary, health authorities investigated an out-
break that occurred in June to July 2012 in a summer 
camp [3]. Its two confirmed cases both reported eating 
meatballs containing turkey meat. Leftover meatballs 
were not available for testing, but frozen turkey meat 
from the batch used to prepare the meatballs was 
positive for S. Stanley with the outbreak PFGE profile. 
Environmental isolates taken in August 2012 at the fac-
tory that processed this turkey meat also had a PFGE 
pattern indistinguishable from that of the outbreak 
strain. Isolates from the farm and slaughterhouse that 
supplied this contaminated meat tested positive for 
S. Stanley repeatedly during routine investigations in 
2012, although no PFGE results were available.
European Union investigation 
Descriptive epidemiology 
Between 1 August 2011 and 31 January 2013, 710 human 
cases of S. Stanley infection were reported in 10 EU 
Member States: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. Of these, 281 (40%) were con-
firmed cases (Figures 1 and 2). PFGE testing was not 
performed on the remaining 429 probable cases. 
The median age, for the 493 cases with available infor-
mation, was 16 years (range: 0–89). Of the 497 cases 
with available information on sex, 259 (52%) were 
male. 
A total of 20 EU/EEA countries reported no unusual 
increase in the number of S. Stanley infections or no 
Figure 2
Distribution of cases of non-travel-related Salmonella Stanley infections (probable and confirmed cases) by European Union 

















cases associated with the outbreak. No cases were 
identified as a result of the INFOSAN alert [3]. 
Geographical clusters were observed in three coun-
tries: Belgium’s cases were reported from the northern, 
Flemish part of the country; Sweden’s cases clustered 
in the southern and south-eastern population centres; 
Austria’s cases clustered in Upper Austria and Carinthia 
(Figure 3), partially due to two large outbreaks. 
The monthly incidence at the EU level increased 
incrementally from February (n=20) until August 
2012 (n=132), decreasing each month thereafter until 
December 2012 (n=19). 
European Union standard questionnaires
By 29 October 2012, ECDC had received 43 question-
naires from five countries: Belgium (n=1), Czech 
Republic (n=24), Greece (n=1), Hungary (n=11) and 
Slovakia (n=6). Three questionnaires were excluded 
from the analysis due to incompleteness. 
Meat was eaten by 39/40 respondents. Products explic-
itly labelled as turkey (e.g. roast turkey and turkey ham) 
Figure 3
Incidence rates of confirmed and probable cases of Salmonella Stanley infection by European Union Member State region, 1 
August 2011–22 October 2012a (n=498)b











NUTS: nomenclature of territorial units for statistics.
a  The map was generated once the outbreak investigation had moved to its monitoring phase. 
b  Cases for whom geographical information was available.
Population data were obtained from the 2010 Eurostat population dataset [9] and the incidence ranges per million population were determined 
using the geometrical interval classification method (ArcGIS v.10.2). The incidence rate in Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Slovakia are represented at NUTS2 level; in Germany and the United Kingdom, at NUTS1 level.
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were reported to have been eaten by 10/40 overall. Two 
of these 10 cases ate barbequed ‘back-yard’ turkey. 
Control measures
The European Commission’s arranged ad hoc tel-
econferences to ensure communication between the 
competent authorities and trace-back/trace-forward 
investigations to more accurately determine the source 
of the outbreaks. Control measures were coordinated 
at the national level and communicated between coun-
tries, e.g. in a RASFF notification from Austria [12].
Microbiological investigation of human, food 
and veterinary samples
Of the 21,748 entries in the PulseNet Europe PFGE sur-
veillance database between 1994 and 2008, 91 (0.4%) 
were S. Stanley. A total of 72 different PFGE types were 
identified; none matched the 2011–12 outbreak PFGE 
profile (Figure 4). Additional comparisons with national 
PFGE databases from EU Member States confirmed that 
the outbreak profile had not been identified among 
isolates of S. Stanley from humans in the EU before 
August 2011.
In 2011, 311 S. Stanley serovar isolations from routine 
monitoring of food and animals were reported to EFSA 
by EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland, of 
which 96% (n=298) were from turkey fattening flocks, 
turkey breeding flocks and turkey meat [3]. By compar-
ison, between 2004 and 2010, S. Stanley was isolated 
on 55 occasions but not from turkeys or turkey meat 
[3]. 
S. Stanley was first identified in turkeys in January 2011 
in Hungary, in breeding flocks. The animals had been 
imported as day-old chicks from a German hatchery, 
having tested negative for Salmonella spp. on arrival. 
Later that year, S. Stanley also appeared in turkey fat-
tening flocks in Hungary (data not shown); however, no 
PFGE results were available for these isolates. 
Austria’s turkey hatchery received regular consign-
ments of hatching eggs from a turkey parent flock in 
Hungary. Animal samples (boot swabs) from that parent 
flock were sent to the Austrian hatchery as part of its 
self-monitoring: they tested positive for nalidixic acid 
mono-resistant S. Stanley on several occasions from 
June 2011 onwards. Samples from the Austrian hatch-
ery, taken in March 2012, also tested positive for the 
outbreak strain. In 2012, the Austrian hatchery distrib-
uted day-old chicks to fattening farms in Austria and 
10 other countries, some of which reported confirmed 
human cases (Czech Republic and Hungary) and some 
that did not report any human cases (Croatia, Poland, 
Serbia and Slovenia). Subsequent to the detection of 
S. Stanley with the outbreak PFGE profile in a ‘turkey 
stick’ produced in Austria, the Austrian food authori-
ties issued a RASFF notification on 10 September 2012 
[12].
In 2012 in Hungary, 24 turkey holdings were found to 
be infected with S. Stanley (no PFGE results were avail-
able). Hungary isolated S. Stanley from 13 food sam-
ples from January to September 2012; all but one were 
from turkey meat; one sample was from broiler chicken 
meat (no PFGE results were available). 
During the investigation, ECDC received PFGE profiles 
of 488 S. Stanley isolates from human and non-human 
samples from 15 EU/EEA countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Finland, 
France, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovak Republic and the United Kingdom). A total of 
464 PFGE profiles were included in the analysis, as 24 
profiles were excluded for quality reasons. BnlI-PFGE 
profiling of a selection of human, animal, food and 
environmental isolates from three countries (Austria, 
Belgium and Hungary) confirmed the clonality of the 
XbaI-PFGE outbreak strain. The XbaI-PFGE outbreak pro-
file was identified in 346 of the 464 profiles analysed. 
For the isolates from human cases, ECDC received PFGE 
profiles of 234 isolates indistinguishable from the 
outbreak profile, from 281 reported confirmed cases. 
These 234 isolates with the outbreak profile were 
received from eight EU countries and showed that the 
first isolate from a human case was from Austria, from 
July 2011. 
A total of 102 of 112 (91%) isolates from animals, food, 
feed and environment were related to the turkey indus-
try (Table). Of these 102 isolates, 20 were from turkey 
and turkey fattening flocks, 50 were from turkey meat 
or turkey-containing products originating from eight 
EU countries, one was from feed (consisting of turkey 
by-products) for fur animals and 31 were from environ-
mental samples. The seven non-turkey-containing food 
products containing isolates with the outbreak profile 
included poultry and beef. Turkey hatcheries and tur-
key farms were the origin of 31 of the 33 indistinguish-
able environmental isolates. 
Discussion
This is the first reported multicountry food-borne out-
break of S. Stanley infection in the EU. More than a 
third of EU countries were affected between 2011 and 
2012. Multisectoral investigation of the incidence and 
distribution of the outbreak resulted in strong evi-
dence pointing towards the turkey production chain 
and confirming the emergence of a new microbial clone 
within the EU. The PFGE typing with a second enzyme 
supported this conclusion. The strong microbiological 
evidence for turkey being the main infection source 
was supported by food and animal investigations, 
most particularly the temporal correlation between the 
emergence of S. Stanley in the turkey production chain 
before the outbreak in humans and identification of the 
outbreak strain in a batch of turkey meat consumed by 
two cases in Hungary.
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Figure 4
Dendrogram showing the similarity relationships of the 2011–12 European Union Salmonella Stanley outbreak strain among 
the different XbaI-PFGE types of S. Stanley isolates in the PulseNet Europe surveillance database (1994–2008)
DK: Denmark; ES: Spain; FI: Finland; IE: Ireland; NL: the Netherlands; PFGE: pulsed-field gel electrophoresis; UK: United Kingdom.
The XbaI-PFGE pattern of the 2011–12 European Union outbreak strain is marked with a red box.
The dendrogram was created with Bionumerics, with tolerance and optimisation set at 1.5%. Analysis of the pattern variation within the 










































































































































































































































































Challenges in investigating a potentially widely 
distributed food source 
This outbreak highlights the challenges in detecting 
and investigating food-borne events when contami-
nation occurred early in the animal production chain, 
resulting in multiple vehicles of infection, contami-
nated over a long time period. Breaches in correct food 
handling resulted in sporadic cases and limited point-
source community outbreaks in several countries.
Due to early contamination of the turkey production 
chain, subsequent cross-contamination of other food-
stuffs may have occurred. Therefore, positive findings 
in other food items (e.g. broiler meat and beef) are 
expected and do not contradict the main conclusion of 
a contaminated turkey meat production chain being the 
primary source of infection.
Standard questionnaires for affected countries did 
not allow the identification of a specific food item as 
a common exposure for cases. The questionnaires 
were completed by 4% (11/246) of cases in Hungary 
and were not used in Austria, two countries with 61% 
(n=436) of all 710 cases; therefore, their representa-
tiveness was low. The development of the question-
naires was complicated by the sheer variety of meat 
choices, including national food specialties, within and 
between affected countries. Because of typing and 
reporting delays, many cases were interviewed long 
after their illness, increasing recall bias. Additionally, 
previous experience from a Salmonella outbreak in 
Germany suggested that assessment of turkey meat 
consumption using food consumption surveys is diffi-
cult, especially when the meat was in a composite food 
or labelled as ‘poultry’ (C Frank, personal communica-
tion, August 2012). These factors make it unlikely that 
a traditional case–control study at EU level would have 
provided strong epidemiological evidence. In such out-
breaks, carefully performed retrospective analytical 
epidemiological studies on point-source sub-outbreaks 
would be more efficient in gathering epidemiological 
evidence. Detailed investigation, including analysis of 
recipes, shopping bills or loyalty card records may be 
effective additional tools if cases are identified and 
interviewed in a timely manner [6,13,14]. 
The distribution of the cases in the Flemish region of 
Belgium was surprising. Most likely this reflects differ-
ent eating habits or food distribution channels between 
Flemish- and French-speaking Belgium. This epidemio-
logical characteristic could not be further investigated 
as it would have required intense trace-back, which 
was not possible at the time. 
The added value of molecular typing for outbreak 
investigation has been discussed previously [15,16]. 
The standard PulseNet PFGE method is still the gold 
standard molecular typing method for Salmonella iso-
lates. In spite of PFGE being laborious, taking two to 
three days, and the quality being dependent on equip-
ment and technicians’ skills, the PFGE testing was not 
a limiting factor for implementation of control meas-
ures. However, the lack of an integrated PFGE typing 
database for human and non-human Salmonella iso-
lates required time-consuming coordination efforts at 
EU level. Therefore, further work is needed to allow 
rapid comparison of PFGE patterns across laboratories. 
Antibiotic resistance data provided supportive evi-
dence during the investigation. The resistance profile 
was not included in the case definition due to varia-
tions in national testing panels and methods, as well 
as different interpretive standards for testing human 
and animal isolates, which precluded comparability. 
This outbreak demonstrates the complexity of defin-
ing triggers for implementation of control measures. 
How much evidence is needed to incriminate vehicles/
sources and launch appropriate control measures that 
could have positive protective public health effects but 
also financial consequences? At the European level, 
the role of ECDC and EFSA as risk assessment agencies 
is to provide all available evidence and critical analy-
sis for risk managers at national and EU level so that 
appropriate control measures can be implemented. 
Feedback from risk managers on the implemented con-
trol measures supports the risk assessors in their con-
tinuous assessment of the event. Indeed, coordination 
of trace-back and trace-forward activities during large 
and complex multicountry outbreaks is crucial. This 
need was also underlined during a simulation exercise 
Table 
Source of isolation of Salmonella Stanley isolates with 
an XbaI-PFGE profile indistinguishable from that of 
the European Union 2011–2012 outbreak strain (n=346, 
aggregated data)
Source of isolation Number of Isolates
Human 234
Animal (boot swabs) 21
Turkey (undefined flock type) 12









Turkey-containing fur-animal feed 1
Environment 33
Turkey hatchery/farm (floor) 18
Turkey hatchery (breeding machine ) 9
Turkey hatchery/farm (undefined) 4
Other (dishcloth and refrigerator) 2
Total 346
PFGE: pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
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in May 2013 attended by representatives from the pub-
lic health and food safety sector from 29 EU/EEA coun-
tries, Croatia, Switzerland and Turkey, EU agencies, 
Health Security Committee Communicators’ Network 
communication specialists, the European Commission’s 
Directorate-General for Health and Consumers (DG 
SANCO) and the World Health Organization Regional 
Office for Europe [17].
The 2003 regulation of the European Parliament and 
Council and its implementing provisions requires 
countries to monitor Salmonella serovars of public 
health relevance in breeding hens, laying hens, broil-
ers and turkeys in the EU [18]. Results must be known 
before slaughter to permit appropriate measures that 
reduce consumers’ exposure. Although EU targets for 
the reduction of Salmonella in turkey flocks are set up 
for S. Enteritidis and S. Typhimurium only [19], control 
measures such as biosecurity measures at farms and 
hygiene at slaughter are common to all serovars [19]. 
Therefore, control of Salmonella contamination in tur-
key flocks should result in the control of S. Stanley. 
In 2013, the number of human cases reported in the 
EU decreased compared with the outbreak’s peak in 
2012, but was still higher than that observed in 2009 
and 2010 [20] More recently, two outbreaks of infec-
tion with the S. Stanley outbreak strain were reported 
by Germany (December 2013) and Austria (April 2014): 
both were due to consumption of contaminated tur-
key meat [20]. This may indicate that S. Stanley is still 
circulating in the turkey production chain in some EU 
Member States in 2014. 
Future directions
 For this outbreak, a joint ad hoc molecular typing data-
base for comparison of human, animal, food and envi-
ronment isolates was established at EU level. ECDC has 
upgraded TESSy and EPIS-FWD with a capacity to col-
lect and analyse molecular typing and epidemiological 
data to facilitate the rapid detection of emerging clones 
and dispersed food-borne outbreaks in humans. At 
present, the pilot project includes reporting of PFGE for 
Salmonella spp., Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli 
and Listeria monocytogenes, as well as multiple-locus 
variable-number of tandem repeats analysis (MLVA) 
data for S. Typhimurium. EFSA, in collaboration with 
relevant European reference laboratories, is establish-
ing similar molecular typing data collection for iso-
lates from food and animal sources. This outbreak of 
S. Stanley infection demonstrated the importance of 
agreeing on the use of comparable molecular typing 
methods in both sectors.
A new version of EPIS-FWD was launched in July 2013. It 
links to TESSy and so facilitates assessment of clusters 
detected though molecular surveillance of human iso-
lates. The new platform also allows food and veterinary 
experts to be invited to join designated discussions, to 
promote the intersectoral sharing of operational infor-
mation [7]. 
Following this outbreak, ECDC, EFSA and the European 
Commission have been jointly developing procedures 
to ensure coordinated investigation and cross-sector 
data exchange. ECDC’s Toolkit for investigation and 
response to food and waterborne disease outbreaks 
with an EU dimension provides material for public 
health investigators that also aims to aid coordina-
tion of such outbreak investigations in Europe [21]. 
The outbreak investigation reported here highlights 
the importance of timely submission of molecular typ-
ing data. Routine molecular typing and the prospective 
analysis of these data on a European level can facili-
tate early outbreak detection, more efficient outbreak 
investigation and influence intervention decisions. 
The European Commission has also initiated extensive 
training within the ‘Better training for safer food’ pro-
gramme [22], aiming at training multidisciplinary teams 
to investigate food-borne outbreaks.
Conclusions
The PFGE pattern of the outbreak strain was new and 
emerged in 2011 in the EU. As the outbreak was noted 
among persons without travel history outside the EU, 
exposure to contaminated vehicles presumably took 
place in the EU. The temporal distribution of cases 
indicated gradual spread and transmission originating 
from persistent common sources. The broad geograph-
ical distribution of cases and non-human isolates sug-
gests contamination of widely distributed products in 
several EU countries. 
Comparison of PFGE profiles from human, veteri-
nary and food isolates pointed towards a common 
source: the turkey production chain. The emergence of 
S. Stanley isolates in animals and food preceded the 
large increase in the number of human cases by less 
than a year and emergence took place mostly within 
turkey production. Identification of the outbreak strain 
in turkey meat at farm, factory and fork level in a 
number of countries confirms that the contamination 
occurred early in the animal production chain. 
This outbreak investigation was complex, highlighting 
the difficulties in performing coordinated multicountry 
investigations from farm to fork. Early collaboration 
across public health, veterinary and food sectors in a 
One Health approach will help the EU’s reactivity to 
future multicountry outbreaks, for timely implementa-
tion of control measures.
10 www.eurosurveillance.org
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